All scores →
Loading…
Loading…
Loading…

Why teams stopped taking midrange shots: the efficiency argument

By 4Basketball Staff · · 10 min read

The case against the long two-pointer is a piece of arithmetic. This article works through points per shot by zone, the break-even percentages, the free-throw effect and the exceptions that keep great shooters in business.

For most of basketball history, a jump shot from 15 to 20 feet was the sport's default good shot. A player came off a screen, rose up over a defender and either made it or did not, and a coach had little to say except to praise or blame the result. Today the same shot is the one a team's analysts like least. The league's shot charts, which once showed a smear of attempts across the floor, now show clusters at the rim and beyond the arc, and a pale band between them.

The reason is an argument about efficiency, and it is a simple one. This article walks through it with numbers: how many points each kind of shot produces, what shooting percentage each needs to break even, how free throws and rebounds change the picture, and why the argument is a statement about averages that great individual shooters can and do defy. The history of the shot and the case for its revival are told in Why the midrange jump shot fell out of fashion, and why it is returning, and the technique in The mid-range game: pull-ups, the elbow jumper and footwork. This piece is the numbers.

The unit of the argument: points per shot

Every shot can be given a value, the average number of points it produces each time it is taken. The calculation is the points the shot is worth multiplied by the proportion of the time it goes in. A two-point shot that goes in 50 percent of the time is worth 1.00 point per attempt. A three-point shot that goes in 35 percent of the time is worth 1.05. A layup that goes in 65 percent of the time is worth 1.30. This is the foundation of Points per possession: why efficiency beats volume: if you want to score, you should take the shots that produce the most points per attempt.

The league-wide figures vary from season to season and depend on how a zone is defined, but the broad shape has been stable for years. The table gives rounded figures typical of the recent NBA.

Shot Typical success rate Points per attempt
At the rim (restricted area) About 65 percent About 1.3
Corner three About 38 to 39 percent About 1.15
Three above the break About 35 to 36 percent About 1.05 to 1.08
Midrange jump shot About 40 to 42 percent About 0.8 to 0.85

These are approximations, and the exact values change each season. The important feature is the ordering. The midrange shot sits at the bottom, by a gap that is not small: a team that swaps ten midrange attempts for ten above-the-break threes gains, on these numbers, roughly two points per ten shots. Over the hundred or so shots a team takes in a game, a systematic shift of twenty attempts is worth somewhere around four or five points, which is a large number in a league where the margin between the best and worst teams is a handful of points per game.

Break-even percentages

Another way to see the argument is to ask how well a player must shoot for each type of shot to be worth taking. The break-even is the percentage at which the shot produces a chosen number of points per attempt.

Target points per attempt Two-pointer needs Three-pointer needs
1.00 50 percent 33.3 percent
1.05 52.5 percent 35 percent
1.10 55 percent 36.7 percent
1.20 60 percent 40 percent

Put these next to what players actually do. A shooter who makes 36 percent of his threes produces 1.08 points per attempt. To match that from two-point range, he would need to make 54 percent of his long twos. Very few players in the league make that many long twos over a season on any real volume. The shot is not just slightly worse than the three on average; for most players it would have to be made at a rate that almost no one achieves.

The asymmetry also shows how much margin a three has. A player who shoots 34 percent from three is barely above the break-even line for a 1.00-point shot and still produces more than a 50 percent two. A player who shoots 28 percent from three, by contrast, is producing 0.84 points per attempt, no better than the average midrange shot. This is why shooting percentage on threes matters so much, and why a team needs genuine shooters before it can follow the strategy. Without them, the arithmetic does not apply.

Why the long two is the worst of the twos

Not all two-point shots are alike, and the argument does not apply equally to all of them. A two-point attempt can be sorted by distance.

  • At the rim. Layups, dunks and tip-ins are the most efficient shots in the sport, and they also draw fouls.
  • Short midrange. Floaters and short jumpers inside about eight feet fall between the rim and the long jumper. They go in at a decent rate when taken by skilled finishers, and analysts often group them with the rim.
  • The long two. From about 16 feet out to the three-point line, the shot is almost as hard as a three and worth one point less. This is the zone the argument targets.

The long two is the single worst shot on the floor for a simple reason: it has nearly the difficulty of a three, because the shooter is far from the basket with a defender closing, and it pays two. Accuracy falls with distance, but it falls gradually, so a good shooter who steps back from 21 feet to 24 feet gives up a few percentage points at most. Meanwhile the value of a make rises by 50 percent. That small step is the whole story of the long two's decline. The three-point shot also benefits from the geometry described in The three-point revolution in the numbers: its corner version is a shorter shot, and it is the most efficient of the long attempts.

The free throw effect

The table above counts only field goals, which understates the advantage of shots near the basket. A drive or a post-up draws fouls, and a foul brings free throws, which are the most efficient shots in the sport. A player who is fouled on a shot attempt and makes both of two free throws at a 75 percent rate produces, on average, 1.5 points from two attempts at the line; if the shot also counts when it goes in, the total value of the possession rises further. Jump shots draw fouls too, but far less often, because the shooter is farther from the contact.

The result is that the true value of an attempt at the rim is higher than the field goal numbers suggest, and the true value of a midrange jumper is about equal to them. The gap widens when free throws are included. This is the subject of Free throw rate and the value of getting to the line, and it is the reason metrics such as true shooting percentage, covered in True shooting percentage and effective field goal percentage, combine twos, threes and free throws in a single measure. When you evaluate a scorer by true shooting instead of field goal percentage, the player who lives at the rim and the line looks better, and the player who lives in the long two looks worse.

Rebounds, spacing and transition

The shot's value does not end when the ball leaves the shooter's hand. A missed three tends to produce a long rebound, one that carries away from the basket and is harder for the offense to retrieve, so the team that shoots threes gives up some offensive rebounds. A missed shot at the rim produces a short rebound that favors the offense. A missed midrange shot falls in between. These effects are small compared with the shot's own value but not trivial, and they complicate the pure points-per-shot comparison. They are part of the trade-off discussed in Offensive rebounding versus getting back: the central trade-off.

There is also the matter of spacing. A shot's value depends on where the other four players are. A three-point shooter on the perimeter pulls a defender out, and a drive can then find space. A midrange jumper, by contrast, pulls a defender only a few feet out of position and sits in the area where help defenders naturally stand. A team that takes many long twos tends to keep its floor crowded, and a team that takes threes opens the floor. Pace and space: how the three-point shot reshaped spacing develops the point. In shorthand, the efficiency argument is partly about the shot and partly about the geometry it creates.

What the average hides

A table of league-wide figures is an average, and an average conceals three kinds of variation that determine whether the argument applies to a given player or possession.

Who is shooting. League-wide midrange percentages include everyone, from the best shooters in the game to role players who rarely take the shot. A small number of elite scorers make midrange jumpers at rates well above the league average and produce close to a point or more per attempt. Scorers such as Michael Jordan, Dirk Nowitzki and Kevin Durant built careers on shots from this area. For them, the shot is not the least efficient on the floor. It is a tool they have mastered, and the break-even logic means that a player who makes 50 percent of long twos with decent volume is producing a point per shot, a rate that a team should be happy to have.

When the shot is taken. Many long twos come late in the shot clock, when a possession has broken down and the player takes what he can get. Those shots are lower in quality, and they drag down the average, in a way unrelated to the distance itself. An open, in-rhythm jumper from the elbow, off a screen, is a better shot than a contested one with five seconds on the clock. When analysts separate catch-and-shoot from pull-up attempts, and open from contested, the picture becomes more nuanced, which is the kind of splitting made possible by the data described in Expected points and shot quality in the tracking era.

What the defense is offering. The comparison to threes and layups assumes the alternative is available. Many defenses are built to deny exactly those shots, with the big man dropping into the paint to protect the rim and the guards running shooters off the arc. Against such a scheme, the shot that remains is the midrange pull-up, and refusing it entirely can mean passing up a decent shot for a worse one. The coverage is explained in Drop coverage, switching and blitzing: the big man's job against the pick and roll. The sensible conclusion is that the midrange shot should be taken when it is the best shot available and avoided when it is merely the easiest.

This is the point at which a thoughtful fan can go beyond the slogan. The statement "midrange shots are bad" is false as a rule about shots and true as a rule about decisions. The shot is only the least valuable on average because, on average, it is taken when nothing better was available, by players who are not especially good at it. Change the shooter, the situation or the defense, and the value moves. The efficiency argument is a reason to ask, before each shot, what the alternatives are; it is not a prohibition. For a framework, see Shot selection: what makes a good shot good.

How teams actually changed

In practice, teams applied the argument by shaping their rosters and plays. They looked for players who could finish at the rim, shoot threes and draw fouls. They designed offenses to produce shots in those places, using screens and drives to get layups and kick-outs to the corners. They trained players to take the extra step back behind the line. And they asked their big men to pop to the perimeter or dive to the rim, instead of lingering at the elbow. At the extreme, some teams took very few midrange attempts, and league-wide the number fell for years.

On defense, the argument works in reverse. A defense that concedes the midrange to protect the rim and arc is following the same logic. It is giving the offense the least valuable shot and hoping the shooter misses. That is why a skilled midrange scorer is a headache for modern defenses: he turns the defense's choice into a profitable one for the offense.

What the argument cannot tell you

A few limits are worth stating.

  1. It is an average, not a prediction for one shot. A 0.82-point average does not say that the next midrange jumper will miss.
  2. It depends on the league's shooting. The break-even numbers are fixed, but the percentages players actually make are not. If three-point accuracy fell, the case would weaken; if midrange accuracy rose, it would too.
  3. It does not account for playoff conditions. In a playoff series, defenses are well prepared, and a team's usual shots can be taken away. The tolerance for a decent, available shot is higher.
  4. It reads shooting as independent of everything else. Skills trade off against each other, and a team that gives up a skill loses some of its flexibility.

What to take away

The efficiency argument against the midrange comes down to three numbers. A shot at the rim is worth about 1.3 points on average, a three is worth about 1.05 to 1.15, and a midrange jumper is worth about 0.8, and the free throws drawn near the basket widen the gap. A player has to shoot about 54 percent from long two to match a 36 percent three-point shooter, which almost nobody does. The argument is right about the average and wrong as a ban, because the best shooters, the right situations and the right defenses make the shot worth taking. When you watch a game, ask who is shooting, how open he is and what else was available. The scores page is a good place to watch for the results, and the teams section lets you look up the clubs whose styles you want to compare.

Search more on this

Keep reading

Free-throw rate and the value of getting to the line

Free-throw rate measures how often a team or player earns trips to the line. Learn the two versions of the formula, why free throws are the cheapest points in the game, and how rules shape who gets them.

4Basketball Staff · Oct 30, 2026 · 11 min read

Win shares, BPM and VORP: the all-in-one stats

Win shares, box plus-minus and VORP each try to boil a player's season into a single figure. Learn what each measures, how they differ, how to read their scales, and where they fall short.

4Basketball Staff · Oct 12, 2026 · 11 min read

How draft prospects are evaluated with data

Teams use age, efficiency, shooting signals, defensive event rates and measurements to judge draft prospects. This article explains each input, how models combine them, and where the numbers run out.

4Basketball Staff · Nov 4, 2026 · 14 min read