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Why the midrange jump shot fell out of fashion, and why it is returning

By 4Basketball Staff · · 11 min read

The midrange jumper was once the heart of the game, then it was called the worst shot in basketball. This article follows the efficiency argument, the history and the reasons skilled shooters keep bringing it back.

If you watched basketball in the 1980s or 1990s, the midrange jump shot was everywhere. A guard would curl around a screen at the elbow and rise for a fifteen-footer. A forward would catch the ball on the wing, take one dribble and pull up. A star would work his man for a few seconds, create a sliver of space and let it go from eighteen feet. The shot was the game's bread and butter, and the players who made it reliably, from Michael Jordan to Dirk Nowitzki, became legends. A coach who told a player to stop taking those shots would have sounded a bit mad.

Then, over a decade or so, that changed. The midrange shot came to be regarded as the least efficient attempt on the floor, a compromise between the layup and the three-pointer that offered the difficulty of one and the value of the other. Teams cut their midrange attempts sharply. Analysts wrote that the shot was dying. Players who loved it were told it was a bad habit. And yet, within a few years, midrange specialists were winning playoff games, setting scoring records and being praised as throwbacks to something the game had lost. The shot had not died. It had been demoted, and now it was being rehabilitated.

This article tells that story: the arithmetic that sank the midrange, the history that made it important in the first place, the reasons the efficiency argument is correct but incomplete, and the ways in which smart teams and players have found a place for the shot in the modern game. It is a lesson in how a general truth about averages can be misread as a rule about individuals. For the numbers-first version of the argument, see Why teams stopped taking midrange shots: the efficiency argument, and for the technique, see The mid-range game: pull-ups, the elbow jumper and footwork.

What counts as a midrange shot

The term is simple but has a technical definition. A midrange shot is a jump shot taken from outside the immediate area around the basket and inside the three-point line. In practice, that means the zone between about eight feet from the basket and the arc. Shot charts divide it further: the elbows, the baseline, the wings, the top of the key. Most analysts exclude layups, dunks and short floaters from the category and treat them as shots at the rim. What remains is the long two, the shot that is worth two points but taken from a distance at which many players struggle.

The long two is the key variant. A shot from sixteen feet is worth the same as a layup, but it is much harder to make. A shot from twenty-two feet, just inside the arc at the top, is nearly as difficult as a three but worth one point less. That is the root of the efficiency argument.

The arithmetic of the argument

The case against the midrange is easy to state. Over a period of years in the NBA, players have made somewhere around 40 percent of their midrange attempts, give or take a few points, depending on the season and how the zone is defined. Three-point shots have been made at a rate in the mid-30s. A shot at the rim, a layup or a dunk, goes in somewhere above 60 percent.

Multiply by the value of each shot. A 40 percent midrange shot yields about 0.8 points per attempt. A 35 percent three-pointer yields about 1.05. A 60 percent shot at the rim yields about 1.2, and that figure does not count the free throws drawn on such attempts, which push the total higher. By this comparison, the midrange is the worst of the three options by a clear margin. A team that took a hundred midrange shots instead of a hundred threes would score about twenty-five fewer points.

This is the logic behind the analytics-driven offenses that emerged in the 2010s. Their coaches asked their players to take shots in three places: at the rim, from three, and at the free-throw line. The Houston Rockets under Daryl Morey became the most extreme example, building a roster and an offense around that principle and taking very few midrange shots. The broader context is in The three-point revolution in the numbers and Points per possession: why efficiency beats volume.

The effect on the league was dramatic. Midrange attempts fell steadily across the 2010s while three-point attempts rose. Shot charts that once showed a scattering of attempts across the floor began to resemble a map with two hot spots, the basket and the arc, and a cold, pale region between them.

The history that made the shot matter

To understand why the shot mattered so much, you have to remember the game it came from. For decades, the three-point shot did not exist in the NBA. It was introduced in 1979, and for years teams used it sparingly. The three-point line was also moved closer for three seasons in the mid-1990s, a change that encouraged some additional attempts but was later reversed. In that world, the best shot a team could create with a skilled scorer was a two-pointer from a good spot, and a mid-range jumper from a favorite spot was often the best available.

The midrange also reflected the style of defense. For much of the game's history, defenders were allowed more physical contact on the perimeter and kept their positions near the paint. Driving to the rim meant meeting a crowd of big men. Three-pointers were considered a gimmick or a desperation. The shot that a scorer could create reliably, with a screen and a bit of separation, was the pull-up from the elbow or the wing.

Great players built careers on it. Michael Jordan's fadeaway and pull-up from the elbow were the engine of the Chicago Bulls' offense, as described in Michael Jordan: career, style and legacy. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's skyhook was a different kind of midrange weapon, a shot from close to the basket that was nearly unstoppable. Dirk Nowitzki's one-legged fadeaway from the elbow made a 7-footer into a scorer defenders could not stop. Reggie Miller, Larry Bird and Kobe Bryant all hit mid-range shots in the pivotal moments of games. The shot was a mark of artistry.

Why the argument is correct, and why it is incomplete

The efficiency argument is correct on average. If you take every midrange shot in the league and compare it to every three-pointer, the three is worth more. But averages hide a lot, and in three respects the argument needs qualification.

First, the average midrange shot is poor because of who takes it and when. In many cases, a midrange jumper is what is left at the end of a failed possession. The clock is winding down, the defense has taken away the drive and the three, and the shooter pulls up from wherever he is. Those shots are contested, hurried and unplanned. A midrange shot from a skilled shooter in rhythm, with an open look, is a different product from the league-wide average. When a team's analysts look at the data, the midrange seems terrible partly because the data include so many bad attempts. A player with a reliable pull-up who takes the shot in a set rhythm may shoot a much higher percentage than the average.

Second, the comparison assumes the alternative is available. The argument says: instead of the midrange shot, take a three. But in many possessions, the defense is designed to deny the three and the rim. A modern defense that is built to run shooters off the line, protect the basket and pack the paint will give up a midrange shot. If the offense refuses to take it, it must either force a worse shot or turn the ball over. The relevant comparison is not the midrange against the best shot in the abstract, but the midrange against what is actually available.

Third, the shot has a strategic effect beyond its own value. A player who can punish a defense from the midrange forces that defense to guard him differently. A defender who drops back to deny the drive and the three must now come up to contest the pull-up, which opens the lane for drivers. A team that never threatens from the midrange lets the defense sit comfortably in a single posture. The threat of the shot, like the threat of a three, changes the shape of the defense. This is the thread that connects the shot to the idea of spacing, discussed in Pace and space: how the three-point shot reshaped spacing.

Why the shot is returning

Several developments have contributed to the revival.

The playoffs. In the postseason, defenses are better prepared and more focused. They switch screens, pack the paint and take away the easy looks. Teams that rely heavily on threes and layups sometimes find that their normal shots are taken away. A player who can create a midrange shot against a set defense gives the offense a dependable option. Several of the league's best scorers made their reputations in the playoffs with this skill.

Defensive schemes. The prevalence of drop coverage, in which the big man sags into the paint on the pick and roll, practically offers the midrange shot to the ball handler. A guard who is skilled at stopping and shooting from fifteen feet can punish the coverage. The defense must then adjust, and the sequence of adjustments is a chess match in which the midrange is a key piece. The coverage is described in Drop coverage, switching and blitzing: the big man's job against the pick and roll.

Skilled shooters. The league has produced players who have simply refined the shot to a high level. A player who makes 50 percent of his midrange attempts is generating a point per attempt, which is competitive with the three and not far behind the rim. The existence of such players shows that the shot is not inherently bad; it is only difficult, and difficult shots can be mastered. A handful of stars in the 2010s and 2020s built their offensive games around the midrange and kept scoring efficiently.

The late clock. When the shot clock runs down, a team does not have the luxury of waiting for a perfect look. A player who can make a contested midrange shot is worth more than one who must settle for something else. The shot is a safety valve.

A corrective to over-correction. Some teams took the logic of the efficiency argument too far, to the point that their offenses became predictable. When every player is told to shoot only threes and layups, defenses can plan for exactly that. Mixing in the midrange makes the offense harder to guard. As in many sports, the pendulum swung and then came back toward the middle.

What it takes to make the shot work

If the midrange is to be an asset rather than a liability, a few conditions apply. They offer a useful guide to when a team should embrace it and when it should avoid it.

  1. Shooter quality. The shot is worth taking when the shooter makes it at a high rate. A player who shoots 45 percent or better from the midrange is producing close to a point per attempt and should keep shooting. A player who shoots 35 percent should look for something else.
  2. Shot type. A catch-and-shoot from the elbow, with the feet set and no defender close, is far better than a dribbling pull-up with a hand in the face. The first can be a good shot for many players. The second is a good shot only for skilled ones.
  3. Context. In the first twenty seconds of a possession, a team usually has better options. Late in the clock, the shot becomes more valuable.
  4. Role. The shot is most useful as a complement to rim attacks and threes, not a substitute. A team whose offense is entirely midrange is easy to defend.
  5. Defensive coverage. Against drop coverage or heavy help, the midrange is more available and more valuable.

There is one more point about the shot that deserves emphasis. A midrange jumper is more repeatable than a floater or a contested layup, because the shooter controls the mechanics. It is a skill that can be practiced and improved. The best midrange shooters spend years refining footwork, balance and release, which is why their shots are so reliable. For related ideas about choosing shots, see Shot selection: what makes a good shot good.

A way of seeing the cycle

The history of the midrange shot is a lesson in how a sport learns. An old practice is questioned by data. The data show a flaw, and teams change their behavior sharply. The change reveals a new set of problems, because the data were describing an average and not a rule. Teams then refine their understanding, keeping the insight and recovering what the over-correction discarded.

The insight that survives is that shot values are not equal and that teams should be deliberate about which shots they take. The recovery is that individual skill and context matter. A shot is not good or bad in itself. It is good or bad for a particular player, in a particular moment, against a particular defense. The midrange is not a shot to avoid, but a shot to earn the right to take.

What to take away

The midrange jump shot fell out of fashion because the arithmetic of the three-pointer and the rim made the long two the worst average shot on the floor, and teams acted on that logic by cutting those attempts. It is returning because the average hides the cases in which the shot is a real weapon: skilled shooters, late clocks, playoff defenses and coverages that give it away.

For a fan, the useful habit is to ask not whether a shot is "good" in general but whether it is good for this player in this situation. When you see a star pull up from fifteen feet against a sagging big man, you are watching a decision that the numbers would have mocked ten years ago and that the best teams now accept. When you see a team refuse the same shot in favor of a contested three, you are watching the opposite mistake. The game is a conversation between what is efficient on average and what is possible for the people on the floor, and the midrange sits right in the middle of it. To see how analysts chart these shots, read Shot charts: how to read where players score.

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