How a team wins when it is the worse team: underdog basketball
Weaker teams rarely win by playing the same game as the stronger side. This article explains the underdog's toolkit of variance, tempo, defense and nerve, with examples from the NCAA tournament and the NBA.
In most sports, the better team wins most of the time, and basketball is the sport where that is most true. A basketball game has about a hundred possessions per side in the NBA, and every possession is a small trial. Over a hundred trials, talent shows up. The stronger team usually makes more of its shots, forces more mistakes and wins the rebounds. That is why the best team in a seven-game series is almost always the one that advances, and why upsets in the NBA playoffs are rarer than in many other sports.
And yet underdogs do win, and in the single-elimination setting of the college tournament they win often enough to give the event its identity. The question this article addresses is how. If a team is worse, whether in talent, size, depth or experience, what can it do to improve its chances? The answer is not to try harder or to play the same way with more determination. That seldom works. The answer is to change the shape of the game, so that the stronger team's advantages count for less and the weaker team's few strengths count for more.
This is a practical topic with historical depth. Coaches have been devising ways to beat better teams for as long as the sport has existed, and the methods fall into a small number of families. We will look at each of them in turn: reducing the number of possessions, increasing the variance of shooting, forcing turnovers, changing the defensive look, using the rules, and managing the psychology of being the underdog. Along the way we will draw on famous cases, from North Carolina State's championship in 1983 to Villanova's in 1985 and the Virginia–UMBC game of 2018, and on the NBA's occasional surprises. The statistical side of why upsets occur is covered in Why upsets happen: the maths and the myths.
The underdog's basic problem
Start with the underlying mathematics, in plain terms. In any game, a team's score is the sum of the points it earns on each possession. Each possession is a random event with some average value, such as 1.1 points for a good team and 1.0 for a weaker one. The better team does not win every possession. It wins slightly more of them, or earns slightly more per possession. The difference is small, perhaps a few points over a hundred possessions, but it is persistent.
Randomness is what gives the underdog a chance. The average value of a possession is not the same as its outcome. A team can have a 1.1 expected points per possession and score a lot fewer in a given game through bad luck, and the opposite team can score a lot more through good luck. The size of that random swing depends on the number of possessions and the volatility of each. With more possessions, the randomness averages out and the better team wins more reliably. With fewer, it does not.
That observation leads to the central idea of underdog strategy: the weaker team wants more variance, not less. A favorite wants the game to be predictable, with many possessions and few surprises. An underdog wants it to be chaotic, short and swingy. Every tactic in the underdog's toolkit is a way of increasing the randomness of the result, or of narrowing the gap in expected points, or both.
Fewer possessions: shortening the game
The simplest way to add variance is to reduce the number of possessions. If a game has seventy possessions per side instead of a hundred, the better team has seventy chances to prove its superiority instead of a hundred. The gap in total points is smaller, and a lucky streak matters more.
A slow pace is therefore a classic underdog weapon. The weaker team holds the ball, runs its offense until the shot clock is nearly out, and takes a shot late. Its defense retreats and sets up in the half court instead of pressing. The aim is to turn a potential blowout into a low-scoring, close game in which the final possessions decide the outcome.
The historical forerunner is the practice of stalling, and the extreme version was the four corners offense, which keeps the ball in the hands of the best ball handler while the other players spread to the corners. The strategy was prominent before the introduction of the shot clock in college basketball in the 1980s, when teams that led or wanted to keep a game close could simply hold the ball. Dean Smith's North Carolina teams made the four corners famous, and the story is told in The four corners and the history of stalling. With the shot clock, the extreme version disappeared, but the principle lives on in the slow, deliberate offenses of teams that want to keep games short.
A well-known example of the modern approach is the style of Virginia under Tony Bennett, which combined a slow tempo with a sagging defense. That style made Virginia very hard to beat. Interestingly, the same slow tempo produced the one famous loss mentioned below, when the roles reversed, and Virginia, the favorite, saw the variance work against it. Pace is a tool for whoever is weaker on a given night, and a team can be the favorite in one game and the underdog in the next.
Slowing the game has a cost: it also reduces the weaker team's own scoring chances. A team that cannot score efficiently in the half court may lose a slow game 55–48 instead of a fast game 90–75, and the first is a smaller margin but still a loss. The slow style works best for teams that are strong defensively and can generate a good shot even against a set defense.
More threes: raising the variance of scoring
The second tool is the three-point shot. A three is worth 50 percent more than a two, but it goes in less often. The result is that three-point shooting is more volatile than two-point shooting. A team that takes 40 threes can make 8 or 18, and the difference between those results is enormous, while a team that takes 40 twos will see a smaller swing, in relative terms.
For an underdog, this volatility is an asset. If a weak team shoots a lot of threes, there is a chance, perhaps not a large one but a real one, that it will make enough of them to win. Rather than trying to outscore the favorite on two-point baskets, where the favorite's advantage in size and athleticism is greatest, it relies on the distribution of the long shots. In effect, the underdog is buying a lottery ticket with a better-than-usual chance.
The risk is symmetrical. A cold night from distance ensures defeat. This is not a strategy that guarantees an upset, only one that makes it more probable than it otherwise would be. The strategy is also stronger when the team has shooters who are good rather than merely willing. A team full of poor shooters that launches threes is not buying a lottery ticket but a bad bet. The modern three-point era made the tactic available to more teams, as described in The three-point revolution in the numbers.
A famous example of an underdog riding hot shooting is Villanova's championship in 1985, a team that shot almost perfectly in a final against Georgetown, a team with more size and talent. The game is described in The 1985 Villanova upset of Georgetown and the great title games. It is a fine example of how an excellent shooting night, a controlled pace and a well-chosen game plan could outweigh a talent gap. At the same time, such nights do not materialize from nowhere; they come from shooters who are capable of them and an offense designed to create good looks.
Forcing mistakes: the press and the trap
The third family of tactics attacks the favorite's possessions rather than the underdog's. If the stronger team is made to commit more turnovers than usual, the gap in expected points narrows, because turnovers cost a possession outright and often lead to easy baskets for the other side. A press, in which defenders pressure the ball handler over the full length of the court, aims to do exactly that.
Press defenses have a long history as an underdog's tool. They tire opponents, disrupt rhythm, create steals and speed up the game. They are especially effective against teams with few good ball handlers and against teams that are slow to bring the ball up the floor. The mechanics are explained in Press defense: full-court, three-quarter and half-court traps, and the offensive counters in Breaking the press: spacing, passing lanes and calm.
The press has its own risks. If the opponent breaks it, the defense is left with fewer players back, and the result is an easy basket. A press also requires depth, since the pressure is exhausting. An underdog with a short bench may find that its players are too tired to keep up with a favorite that rotates fresh legs. The press therefore suits teams with quick, deep rosters and a plan to use them.
VCU's run to the Final Four in 2011, with the style called "Havoc," is a recent illustration. The team pressured opponents across the floor and forced mistakes, and it was unusual in how it made an aggressive approach the core of its identity. The point is not that the press always wins but that it changes the game in a way that benefits the weaker side.
Changing the defensive look
The fourth family involves defensive schemes that the favorite does not expect or is not prepared for. Zone defenses, matchup zones, box-and-ones and other "junk" looks force the opponent to adjust, and adjustment takes time. A favorite that has prepared to face man-to-man defense may struggle against a zone, particularly if its shooters are not accurate enough to punish it.
The logic is that a strong team's advantage often lies in individual matchups, in which its better players beat their defenders one-on-one. A zone reduces the number of one-on-one confrontations and protects the weak links. It also keeps the underdog's big men near the basket, which can offset a size disadvantage. The structure is described in Zone defense in basketball: 2-3, 3-2, 1-3-1 and matchup zones explained.
The tactic works best in short series or single games, where the opponent has little time to prepare. In a seven-game series, a good team will usually find an answer after a game or two. That is one reason upsets are more common in tournaments than in best-of-seven series. The defender's surprise has a limited shelf life, which ties into the cycle of adjustments described in How coaches adjust in a playoff series, game to game.
Using the rules and the details
The fifth family is about small advantages: the last shot, the foul situation, the free throws, the offensive rebound. An underdog that is disciplined in these areas can narrow the gap. It can concentrate on not turning the ball over. It can crash the offensive boards when a miss is likely to lead to a rebound. It can avoid fouling the favorite's best free-throw shooters. It can target the favorite's weakest free-throw shooter late in the game. It can manage the clock so that it gets the last shot.
In a close game, these details decide the outcome. A team that makes the most of them, in the final five minutes, can turn a 60 percent chance of losing into a coin flip. The details of late-game play are covered in Late-game execution: the last two minutes of a close game and Free-throw strategy: shooting, routines and late-game fouling.
An interesting variant is the use of intentional fouls by the trailing team to prolong the game. If the favorite has a weak free-throw shooter, fouling him sends him to the line, where he may miss. This is a small edge, and it appears most often in the closing minutes.
The psychology of the underdog
The sixth family is mental. Underdogs often play with a different attitude than favorites. They have less to lose, they play with a looseness that can improve shooting and decision-making, and they may be fueled by the desire to prove themselves. Favorites may play tight, aware that a loss would be a disaster. A pressure-filled game increases the chance of mistakes, particularly in the late minutes.
Coaches of underdogs work to cultivate belief. They emphasize that the game is winnable, that the favorite is beatable, that the team's plan is sound. The famous example is North Carolina State's run to the 1983 national title under Jim Valvano. The Wolfpack beat Houston, a team with spectacular athletes known as Phi Slama Jama, in the final on a last-second dunk by Lorenzo Charles, and the tournament is remembered as one of the great upsets in college basketball. N.C. State had stayed in games by controlling tempo, fouling to extend opportunities and believing in a late comeback. It is the kind of story that explains why people love the tournament.
Belief is not enough. The underdog has to turn confidence into execution. The point of psychology is to prevent the weaker side from being beaten before the game begins. Many underdogs lose by playing too passively or by panicking when the favorite makes an early run. The ones that win typically stick to their plan, accept that they will fall behind at times and stay within reach.
The nature of the cases
It helps to see how these tools show up in some well-known results.
| Event | Underdog | Key tools |
|---|---|---|
| 1983 NCAA final | North Carolina State | Tempo control, late-game execution, belief |
| 1985 NCAA final | Villanova | Hot shooting, controlled pace, a sharp game plan |
| 2011 Final Four run | VCU | Pressure defense, turnovers, belief |
| 2018 first round | UMBC over Virginia | Shooting variance against a slow-paced favorite |
The cases differ, but each combined at least two of the tools, and each required some luck. The last row is worth noting. UMBC, a 16th seed, defeated top-seeded Virginia, the first time a 16 seed had beaten a 1 seed in the men's tournament. The Retrievers shot well from distance and kept pace in a game in which Virginia's usual strengths did not materialize. It was one of the most dramatic examples of variance in the sport.
In the NBA, upsets are rarer but not unknown. The Miami Heat reached the NBA Finals as an 8 seed in 2023, and the New York Knicks did so in 1999 in a lockout-shortened season. These are exceptions, and each involved more than luck: both teams had strong defense, good coaching and a few stars at the right moment. The longer series makes randomness a smaller factor, so the NBA's underdogs usually need to be genuinely good, not merely lucky.
What the favorite does about it
A favorite can respond to each of these tactics. Against a slow pace, it can push the ball in transition and create easy shots early in the shot clock. Against three-point volume, it can close out hard on shooters and force them to drive. Against the press, it can use its best ball handler and spread the floor. Against a zone, it can move the ball quickly and shoot over it. Against the fouling strategy, it can put its best free-throw shooter on the floor late.
The point is that underdog strategy is a contest of adjustments. The weaker team chooses a shape for the game; the stronger team tries to bend it back. Often the stronger team wins the argument, which is why favorites still win most of the time.
For a statistical perspective on how often favorites win and how seeds translate to results, see The history of the one seed: how often the top seeds win and the broader discussion in Cinderellas: the greatest runs by double-digit seeds.
What to take away
An underdog does not win by playing the favorite's game with more spirit. It wins by changing the shape of the game, reducing the number of possessions, taking shots with more variance, forcing mistakes, showing unfamiliar defensive looks, sweating the small details and keeping its nerve. Each of these has costs, and the best underdogs choose the ones that suit their roster.
For a fan watching a mismatch, the useful questions are: what is the weaker team trying to change, and is it working? Is the pace slow? Are the threes falling? Is the press creating turnovers? If the answer to each is yes, an upset may be brewing. If the answer is no, the favorite's advantages are probably asserting themselves. And for anyone who coaches or plays on the weaker side, the lesson is the same as the one the tournament has taught for generations: you do not need to be better than the other team. You need to make the game one in which being better counts for less. To follow the tournament where these upsets happen, visit the March Madness hub.