Spurs vs Suns: Duncan, Nash and the best series of the 2000s
Four playoff series between San Antonio and Phoenix from 2005 to 2010 pitted Tim Duncan's discipline against Steve Nash's pace and told the NBA which style would shape the next era.
Every era has a question that its best teams are asked to answer. In the NBA of the mid-2000s the question was how basketball should be played: with deliberate half-court precision, or at a sprint? The San Antonio Spurs, coached by Gregg Popovich and anchored by Tim Duncan, offered the first answer. The Phoenix Suns, coached by Mike D'Antoni and run by Steve Nash, offered the second. The two teams met in the playoffs four times between 2005 and 2010, and each series was a referendum.
The Spurs won three of the four. But the scoreboard understates how close the contest was in spirit. The Suns changed how basketball was played, and the Spurs, who beat them, eventually changed to meet them. What looked like a clash between the past and the future was really a long conversation in which each side learned from the other, and by the time the last series ended in 2010, it was difficult to say who had won the argument.
This article walks through the four series, explains the two philosophies and how they met, and offers a view of why the rivalry deserves the label that is attached to it. It is perhaps the most thoughtful matchup of the decade, a collision between two coherent systems, played by exceptional players and coaches. Readers who want to see the individual stars in more detail can turn to the profiles of Tim Duncan and Steve Nash.
Two teams, two ideas
The Spurs were a model of continuity. The franchise had moved from the ABA to the NBA in 1976, and had its first real success under David Robinson, the Navy graduate and center who was joined by Duncan, the first overall pick in 1997, in a pairing that produced a championship in 1999. Popovich, the coach and general manager, built an organization that valued intelligence, humility and defensive discipline. Around Duncan he added Tony Parker, a French guard who was a late first-round pick in 2001, and Manu Ginobili, an Argentine guard selected late in the second round of 1999 who joined the team in 2002. Bruce Bowen, an undrafted forward, became the team's primary perimeter stopper. Robert Horry arrived as a veteran who had won titles elsewhere. The Spurs won championships in 2003, 2005 and 2007, and there are good reasons to think of that team as one of the most underrated dynasties. A profile of the coach and the culture is in Gregg Popovich and the Spurs culture.
The Suns' idea was simpler to describe and harder to execute. D'Antoni took over the team in 2002 and became its coach and lead strategist. His belief was that basketball's best shot was an early one, taken before the defense could set. The Suns would push the ball after every rebound and every made basket, spread the floor with shooters, and run the pick-and-roll at speed. The press nicknamed the approach Seven Seconds or Less, a reference to the idea that the team wanted to shoot within seven seconds of the possession starting. The pieces came together in the summer of 2004 when Nash, who had been a Suns draft pick in 1996, returned as a free agent after six seasons in Dallas. Around him were Amar'e Stoudemire, a powerful, explosive big man who finished lobs and rolled to the rim, Shawn Marion, a long, fast forward who did everything, and shooters such as Joe Johnson, Quentin Richardson and later Leandro Barbosa, Raja Bell and Boris Diaw.
The first season was a revelation. The Suns improved from 29 wins to 62, and Nash was voted the league's Most Valuable Player, an award he would win again in 2006. The idea that a team could play so fast and still be efficient forced the rest of the league to take notice, and the style began to influence teams at every level. The history of the long-range shot, which is the engine of this approach, is told in the history of the three-pointer.
Before the big series
The teams had met in the playoffs once before, in 2000, when the Suns beat the Spurs in the first round while Duncan was sidelined with a knee injury. That series was a footnote, in part because the two teams were so different. The Spurs were the defending champions, an older team that played a slower style and had Duncan as its fulcrum. The Suns, led then by Jason Kidd and Penny Hardaway, were a good team without a distinct identity. It was five years before they met again.
2005: the Western Conference finals
By the time they met in the 2005 Western Conference finals, the Suns were the story of the NBA. They had the league's best record, an offense that scored at will, and a point guard who had just won the MVP award. The Spurs had won the title in 2003 and, with Duncan, Parker and Ginobili at the center of a deep roster, were the Suns' only real rival in the West.
The Suns were not at full strength. Joe Johnson, one of their best shooters and a capable ballhandler, had suffered a broken bone near his eye in the previous round and missed the series. Even so, Stoudemire was superb, scoring more than 30 points per game, and the early games were close. But the Spurs, led by Duncan and Parker, found a rhythm and won the series in five games. It was a clean, efficient victory, and it set the template for the others: the Spurs would absorb the Suns' best punches and respond with calm. San Antonio went on to win the NBA championship in seven games over Detroit, Duncan being named Finals MVP.
2007: the series of the hip check
The 2007 Western Conference semifinals were the most famous of the four, and also the most contentious. The Suns had won 61 games, the Spurs 58, and the series was considered the real conference final, with the winner presumed to be the likely champion.
It turned on a single incident. In Game 4, in Phoenix, with seconds remaining and the outcome all but decided, Robert Horry of the Spurs delivered a forearm and hip check to Nash, driving the Suns' point guard into the scorer's table. A scuffle followed, in which Stoudemire and Boris Diaw, both Suns, left the bench area as the incident unfolded. Under a long-standing league rule, players who leave the bench during an altercation are suspended automatically. Horry was suspended for two games as well, but the rule hit Phoenix harder than San Antonio. Stoudemire and Diaw were two of the team's most important players, and they missed Game 5.
The Spurs won that game and then closed out the series in six games. Many Suns fans believed that the rule had decided the outcome, and some argued that the league should have used discretion. Others noted that the Spurs had already been leading the series and that the rule is applied uniformly. The Spurs went on to sweep the Cleveland Cavaliers in the Finals, in LeBron James's first appearance on that stage, claiming their fourth title of the Duncan era.
2008: the Shaq experiment
The next year they met in the first round, this time with a changed Phoenix team. The Suns had traded Shawn Marion to Miami for Shaquille O'Neal in February, an attempt to add size and a post presence to a roster that had lost to San Antonio in 2005 and 2007. Whether or not the trade made sense on paper, it changed the Suns' pace, and the older O'Neal was not able to keep up with the sprint on which the team had built its reputation.
Game 1 was a classic. It went to two overtimes, with a deep three-pointer by Duncan in the closing seconds helping to extend it, and the Spurs prevailed, 117-115. From that point the series felt like a matter of time. San Antonio won in five games, and D'Antoni left Phoenix at the end of the season. The experiment had failed, and the era of Seven Seconds or Less came to an end in the same moment as the Suns' best chance to beat the Spurs. The Suns' history is told in the Phoenix Suns story, and the Spurs' in the San Antonio Spurs story.
2010: the Suns finally win
The fourth series was a surprise in the opposite direction. Under a new coach, Alvin Gentry, the Suns had returned to a fast, free-flowing style, and Nash, now in his mid-thirties, was still playing at an extremely high level. They had a deeper team than in 2008, with Grant Hill, Jason Richardson, Channing Frye and Robin Lopez contributing around Nash and Stoudemire. The Spurs were older and, in some respects, tired. Duncan was in his thirties, and the lineup that had won titles was beginning to change.
The Suns swept the Spurs in the 2010 conference semifinals, four games to none, their only series win over San Antonio in this stretch, and then advanced to the Western Conference finals, where they lost to the Lakers in six. The sweep was a sort of vindication for Nash and the Suns' approach, though it came after the peak of their run and without a championship attached.
The matchups that shaped the games
Series between these teams turned on a handful of individual contests. The first was Nash against whichever Spurs guard or wing San Antonio sent at him. Nash was not an overwhelming athlete. His power came from his handle, his shooting, and a feel for angles and timing that let him split a pick-and-roll defense with a single dribble. The Spurs' answer was to vary the coverage, sometimes sending a big man to hedge hard, sometimes dropping back, sometimes switching, and to make sure that whoever guarded him was strong enough to absorb contact. Parker, quick enough to keep up with Nash and a strong scorer in his own right, forced Phoenix to defend at the other end as well.
The second contest was Duncan against Stoudemire. Duncan won it on the strength of fundamentals: positioning, footwork, the bank shot off the glass, and a talent for being exactly where a rebound would land. Stoudemire was the more explosive athlete and could overwhelm any defender in a straight line to the rim. Over the long run, that is a contest in which experience tends to beat athleticism, because a big man who always arrives a half-second early can use his body to take away the straight line.
The third was the matter of the supporting cast. San Antonio had Bowen on the perimeter, Ginobili off the bench as a creator and Horry as a veteran who could hit a shot in any situation. Phoenix had a deeper bench in some years, but it relied on players who thrived in a high-tempo system and were less effective when the game slowed down. That, more than any single player, is the difference the Spurs exploited. When the pace dropped, the Suns lost the advantage they had built, and when the pace rose, the Spurs were disciplined enough not to lose their way.
The tempo question
It is worth dwelling on pace, because it is the thread that connects all four series. A basketball game is a negotiation over the number of possessions. A fast team wants more of them, because more possessions means more variance and more chances for its shooters to get hot. A slow team wants fewer, because fewer possessions favors the better half-court team. Every playoff game between the Spurs and Suns was, in part, a fight over that number.
In the regular season the Suns usually won the fight. Opponents who tried to run with them found themselves overmatched, and the Suns scored a lot of points. In the playoffs, though, defenses get better, whistles tighten, and teams game-plan for specific opponents. The Spurs, who had a deep understanding of how to control pace, were able to shrink the number of possessions and make each one count. The lesson that many coaches took from the series was not that fast basketball does not work, but that it needs a defensive foundation to survive the postseason. That insight shaped the next decade of team building.
A ledger of the series
| Year | Round | Winner | Result | A note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | First round | Suns | 3-1 | Duncan out injured |
| 2005 | Conference finals | Spurs | 4-1 | Spurs go on to win the title |
| 2007 | Second round | Spurs | 4-2 | Horry's check on Nash and the suspensions |
| 2008 | First round | Spurs | 4-1 | Double-overtime opener; Shaq on the Suns |
| 2010 | Second round | Suns | 4-0 | Only sweep in the rivalry |
Why the series mattered
It is tempting to say that the Spurs won and the Suns lost and leave it there. The reality is more interesting. The Suns never won a championship, but they changed the way the league thinks about offense. Their emphasis on space, pace and three-point shooting anticipated the style that dominated the following decade. The idea that a team could be built around a point guard, a rolling big man and a group of shooters is now standard, and the evidence of their influence is everywhere in the way teams play.
The Spurs won, and their victories were built on defense, but they also learned from the contest. By 2014, when they won their fifth championship, the Spurs were playing an exceptionally unselfish, fast-moving offense, with the ball changing hands from player to player and shots taken in rhythm. It was a blend of the two teams' ideas: the Spurs' discipline and the Suns' tempo. Seen that way, the rivalry was not a victory of one style over another but a gradual exchange.
The deeper point is that the best rivalries produce a synthesis. Neither Duncan's patience nor Nash's pace would be enough alone; the game that came next needed both. The series between the Spurs and Suns showed an entire league what each approach could do and what it could not.
What to take away
If you want to understand mid-2000s basketball, watch the Spurs and Suns. Watch the 2005 conference finals for the Suns at their most dangerous, the 2007 series for the rules of the game colliding with the heat of a playoff, and the first game of the 2008 series for what endurance looks like in a double-overtime.
And remember that it was a rivalry of equals. Duncan and Nash were both generous, intelligent players who made their teammates better, and their coaches were among the most creative of their generation. The rivalry rewarded those qualities, and it left the league better than it found it.
To follow either team across seasons, visit the playoffs section or the standings.