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Bulls vs Pistons: the Bad Boys and the road to the Jordan dynasty

By 4Basketball Staff · · 10 min read

Three straight playoff defeats by the Detroit Pistons taught Michael Jordan and the Chicago Bulls how to win, and a 1991 sweep ended an era; here is how the rivalry unfolded.

Before Michael Jordan won six championships, he lost to the Detroit Pistons three years in a row. That sentence is simple, and it has been the starting point for most serious accounts of the Bulls' rise. For three consecutive springs, from 1988 to 1990, the best individual player in the world ran into a team that did not care how good he was and decided to make every trip to the basket a negotiation. Then, in 1991, Chicago swept Detroit and never looked back.

The Pistons of those years were nicknamed the Bad Boys, a label they embraced with something between pride and menace. They were deep, hard, and unusually intelligent. They hit people, they talked, and they won two NBA titles in a row, in 1989 and 1990. They were also a team of real skill, with a Hall of Fame point guard in Isiah Thomas, a Hall of Fame guard in Joe Dumars, and a rotation of specialists who knew precisely what their roles were. Reducing them to thugs, as many opponents did at the time, understates how well they played.

This article follows the rivalry from the first meeting in the playoffs in 1988 to the sweep in 1991, explains what the Pistons did to Jordan and what the Bulls changed in response, and looks at what it all meant for the league. For the broader context of the Bulls' run, see the Chicago Bulls' two three-peats and the Jordan era.

Building the Bad Boys

Detroit's team was assembled over most of a decade, mainly by general manager Jack McCloskey and coach Chuck Daly. Thomas, a point guard from Indiana University, was drafted second overall in 1981 and became an All-Star almost at once. Bill Laimbeer, a center with a gift for rebounding and an uncanny ability to irritate opponents, came in a trade with Cleveland in 1982. Daly was hired as head coach in 1983. Dumars arrived in the 1985 draft, from McNeese State in Louisiana, and the Pistons added Rick Mahorn, John Salley, Dennis Rodman and the sixth man Vinnie Johnson, who was called the Microwave because he heated up fast off the bench. Rodman, drafted in the second round in 1986, grew into a rebounding and defensive specialist who guarded almost everyone.

The team's identity was physical, but it was disciplined. Daly insisted on defense and on a clear division of labor. Thomas ran the offense, Dumars guarded the opposing team's best perimeter player, Laimbeer and Mahorn set screens and rebounded, and Johnson scored. They moved into a new arena in Auburn Hills, the Palace, in 1988, one of the first modern venues built with luxury suites, and the move to a high-profile building coincided with the franchise's first period of national success.

The Pistons climbed the Eastern Conference through the late 1980s. They reached the Eastern Conference finals in 1987, losing a seven-game series to Larry Bird's Celtics, a series memorable for Bird's steal of an inbound pass in the closing seconds of Game 5. In 1988 they got past Boston and reached the Finals, where they lost to the Lakers in seven games after Thomas, playing on a badly sprained ankle, scored a Finals-record 25 points in a single quarter in Game 6. Those two years taught Detroit something that Chicago had not yet learned: how to turn a very good team into a champion by being willing to lose first.

Chicago before the Pistons

The Bulls were a different kind of team. Jordan, drafted third in 1984, had been a scoring sensation from his first season, and in 1986-87 he averaged 37 points per game, a total that put him among the most prolific scorers in league history. He won the Most Valuable Player award and the Defensive Player of the Year award in the same 1987-88 season. Yet the Bulls were not championship contenders. Their roster was thin, and the pattern of their games was that Jordan did it, or no one did.

That changed slowly. In 1988 the Bulls traded Charles Oakley to New York for the center Bill Cartwright. Scottie Pippen, a forward from Central Arkansas, had been drafted fifth overall in 1987 by Seattle and traded to Chicago on draft night, and he developed quickly. Horace Grant, a power forward, arrived in the same draft. By 1989 John Paxson, B.J. Armstrong and others were filling out a rotation. The team still lacked a system, and Doug Collins, the coach until 1989, was an intense, tactical man who leaned on Jordan to bail the team out. Even a mid-season experiment in 1989 with Jordan at point guard, which produced a run of triple-doubles, showed how much the team depended on one man.

The Jordan Rules

The Pistons beat the Bulls in the playoffs in 1988, 1989 and 1990. Each series was unlike the last, but each had the same basic ingredient: a defensive plan designed specifically to stop Jordan, which became known as the Jordan Rules.

The plan was not complicated in concept. Detroit's staff recognized that Jordan was too quick and too skilled to be stopped one-on-one by anyone, even Dumars, who was among the best individual defenders in the league. So they sent a second, and sometimes third, defender at him when he moved toward the basket, funneled him toward the middle where the help was waiting, and made sure that every drive ended with contact. On the perimeter they tried to force him left. Inside, they used their big men, particularly Laimbeer and Mahorn, to set a wall and take him down. Jordan was knocked to the floor repeatedly in those years.

It worked, though not completely. In 1988, Detroit beat Chicago in five games. In 1989, in an Eastern Conference finals that Chicago reached after Jordan's famous buzzer-beating shot over Craig Ehlo in a first-round series against Cleveland and a second-round win over the Knicks, the Pistons won in six. In 1990 the series went to seven games. In Game 7 in Detroit the Pistons ran away with a lopsided win, and Pippen, plagued by a migraine headache, was ineffective for much of the night. Jordan averaged huge numbers in all three series. It did not matter, because the Bulls could not get enough from anyone else.

The Pistons themselves won the championship in 1989, sweeping a Lakers team missing Magic Johnson and Byron Scott to injuries, with Dumars named the Finals MVP. They did it again in 1990, beating Portland in five, with Thomas as the Finals MVP. Mahorn had been left unprotected and taken by the Minnesota Timberwolves in the 1989 expansion draft, but the team did not miss a beat, which demonstrated how much the Pistons depended on a system rather than on any single player.

The off-court feud

The tension between Jordan and Thomas was not just professional. It had a history that predated the playoffs, and the history fed on rumor. A widely repeated story held that Thomas and other veterans had frozen Jordan out of the ball during the 1985 All-Star Game as a rookie. Whether or not it was true in the form that circulated, the story was believed in Chicago, and Jordan carried an old resentment into the series. The Pistons, for their part, resented what they saw as a league that favored Jordan in every call and in every headline.

The relationship deteriorated further after 1991. Thomas was not selected for the 1992 United States Olympic team, the first Dream Team, and the reasons have been disputed for decades, with several people pointing fingers at one another. The incident left a lasting bitterness. Many fans still read the rivalry as a fight between two personalities, and the personalities certainly mattered. But the more useful way to read it is as a fight between two ways of building a team.

What changed in Chicago

The decisive change was not a trade. It was a way of thinking. After Collins was replaced by Phil Jackson, who had been an assistant, in 1989, the Bulls began to run the triple-post offense, often called the triangle, developed by assistant coach Tex Winter. It was a system that spread the floor, gave every player multiple options, and relied on reading defenders rather than calling plays. For Jordan, who had been accustomed to taking the ball and creating, it meant sharing. It also meant that when the Pistons sent two defenders at him, he now had teammates who knew what to do with the open man.

Jordan also changed physically. After the 1989 series, he and the Bulls' staff began a weight-training program meant to add strength so that he could take contact. He also began to trust Pippen, Grant and Paxson to make plays, which was the hardest adjustment for a player of his gifts. Jackson, who was known for his interest in psychology and Eastern philosophy, helped the team accept roles rather than individual accounting.

The 1990-91 Bulls won 61 games, and when they met Detroit in the Eastern Conference finals they had home-court advantage for the first time. They swept the Pistons in four games. It was a more thorough win than any of the Pistons' victories over Chicago had been, and the signal moment came at the end of Game 4. With a few seconds left, Thomas and several teammates left the court rather than shake hands with the Bulls. The act was widely criticized, and for many people it was a symbol of a team that could not accept it had been beaten. Some Pistons, including Dumars, stayed on the court and shook hands. The distinction is worth remembering.

The Finals, the three-peat and the aftermath

Chicago went on to beat the Lakers in five games in the 1991 Finals. It was Jordan's first title and the first for the franchise, and the image of him holding the trophy and weeping in the locker room in Los Angeles became one of the iconic images of the era. The Bulls repeated in 1992 and 1993, completing the first of their two three-peats. Pippen, who had struggled in Game 7 of the 1990 series, became one of the best all-around players in the league. Grant became a double-figure rebounder who rarely complained. Jackson turned a talented group into a franchise.

For the Pistons, the end came quickly. Their veterans aged, the supporting cast turned over, and Daly left in 1992, moving on to coach the Dream Team that year in Barcelona and later the New Jersey Nets and Orlando Magic. Thomas tore his Achilles tendon in 1994 and retired. Detroit would not win another championship until 2004, in a very different team with a very different identity, one built on defense, balance and the absence of stars. The story of that franchise is told in the Detroit Pistons story, and the Chicago Bulls story covers the rest of the Bulls' history.

Two theories of a team

Looking back, the rivalry can be read as a collision between two theories about how a basketball team is supposed to work. The Pistons' theory was that a roster of specialists, each doing one or two things at a high level, would beat a roster with one transcendent talent. Thomas ran things, Dumars guarded, Laimbeer rebounded and annoyed, Rodman defended anyone, Johnson scored in bursts. No one needed to be the best player in the league because the system produced results as a whole. Daly's gift was to make that arrangement feel natural to a group of strong personalities.

The Bulls' original theory was nearly the opposite. Give the ball to the best player alive and add whatever supports him. It produced scoring titles and regular-season wins, and it hit a ceiling every spring against a team that knew how to take the best player away. The lesson Chicago took was not that the theory was wrong, but that it was incomplete. A great player becomes far more dangerous when every defender has to worry about four other people, and the triangle was a way of making that worry permanent.

This is the insight that casual retellings tend to miss: the Pistons did not merely beat Jordan, they taught him what a defense can do to a star and what a team can do to a defense. When Chicago later won six titles, the opponents who gave them the most trouble were usually the ones who had a coherent plan for Jordan and the discipline to follow it for forty-eight minutes. Detroit had been the first.

Why the series mattered

The first reason the rivalry mattered is that it changed what a superstar was understood to be. In the late 1980s the league's marketing and the sports press treated Jordan as a phenomenon who would win by force of talent. The Pistons showed that no player, however gifted, could do it alone against a team that was organized to stop him. When Jordan eventually won, he did it as part of a structure, and the structure is why the Bulls won six titles in eight years. His career and legacy cannot be understood without those three defeats.

The second reason is that the Pistons forced the league to think about how to officiate physical play. The sustained contact that Detroit used to slow Jordan raised questions about how many fouls were being called and how many were being ignored. The Pistons helped fuel that debate, and in later decades the league adopted rules aimed at protecting drivers and ball-handlers. They were not the sole reason, but they were a vivid example of the problem.

The third reason is less visible. The rivalry showed what it takes to beat a team that has a clear identity. The Bulls did not beat the Pistons by becoming more like them. They beat them by becoming themselves more fully, with a better system, stronger conditioning and more shared responsibility.

What to take away

If you want a single lesson from the Bulls and Pistons, it is that losing can be part of a plan. Jordan's three straight defeats were not an accident; they were the way he learned what the Bulls lacked. The Pistons gave Chicago an education that no regular-season game could.

It is also a reminder that reputation distorts. The Bad Boys were thugs to some, heroes to others, and a basketball team to anyone who watched closely. They played tough and smart, they won two titles, and they did it against an opponent who was about to become one of the best teams in history. You can trace both franchises' best postseason runs in the playoffs section and see where each stood in the standings in any season through the standings page.

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